

emergence of a diversified network of voluntary groups among workers, students, women, merchants, professionals, civil servants, villagers, Muslims, and Christians. Although these groups did not initiate the uprising, they all joined in quickly providing it with organization, leadership, and coordination. In turn, the Intifada gave many struggling and fragmented groups an infusion of new members and a common set of goals. Before long, the art of association became so closely intertwined with nationalist protest that they were virtually indistinguishable.

Hiltermann and Hunter agree that the growing vigor and resourcefulness of Palestinians' associational life has had far-reaching consequences in and beyond the Occupied Territories. The Uprising was sustained and periodically renewed despite recurrent pronouncements that it had run its course. A whole new tier of "inside" leadership emerged alongside the old guard of the PLO, strengthening Yasser Arafat's claims of preeminence while pushing him toward the more urgent pursuit of a negotiated settlement and a two-state solution. Israeli public opinion was forced to reconsider the costs of continued occupation and the temptations of creeping annexation. American diplomacy was given yet another opportunity to take up the unfinished business of the Camp David accords.

Most important, both writers interpret this florescence of associational activity as convincing proof that Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are capable of representing themselves. Hiltermann and Hunter share remarkably similar views of the historical significance of this change. Their conclusions are nearly identical on four major issues.

First, rapid group development signifies at least the partial resuscitation of civil society in the Palestinian heartland. After experiencing multiple traumas, the sinew and tissue of community have grown back to the point where they can support a stronger awareness of common sentiments and a more complex division of labor. Although neither author uses Durkheimian vocabulary, they furnish vivid descriptions of a society where both "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity" are increasing at the same time.

Second, voluntary groups have become the nucleus of the Intifada and the base of a more powerful national liberation movement. Most groups are allied with one of the competing factions that have fragmented Palestinian politics for decades, particularly with Fatah, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Communist party, and various Islamic groups. At times, this linkage encouraged the proliferation of weak associations, squabbling over the same limited membership. On the other hand, these same connections also invested interest group leaders with important leverage in fashioning new alliances between the factions. Association leaders in the Occupied Territories not only took up key positions on the steering committee of the Intifada, they also pressured the factions to cooperate with one another on the "inside" and the "outside." The result was a more unified PLO with a wider mass following but also with greater responsiveness to constituencies it formerly took for granted or sought to control.

Third, the group network is frequently described as the blossoming infrastructure of a future Palestinian state. This may be the boldest and most debatable conclusion of both books. It is one thing to argue that the

"institutionalization" of the Uprising symbolizes a maturation of Palestinian society and a deepening of its nationalist consciousness. It is quite another thing to suggest that these organizations comprise a state-in-the-making.

Hiltermann and Hunter leave little doubt that the people of the Occupied Territories have cultivated the art of association well enough to represent themselves in several arenas at the same time—locally, regionally, and internationally. Indeed, their achievements have far surpassed the expectations of the PLO and Arab patrons who financed community organizations with every confidence that they would serve their sponsors' interests more than their own. Nevertheless, the authors engage in wishful thinking when they suggest that a vigorous associational life is a way station on the road to an independent state. Yet even this exaggeration has merit if it alerts us to the possibility that a Palestinian state might be politically pluralistic and competitive and thus not easily manipulated by either its leaders or its neighbors.

Fourth, both writers agree that the Intifada is not a social revolution within the Palestinian community. Rather, they note that pressures to sustain a united front during the uprising have postponed demands for social justice accumulating for years among workers, women, youths, and the poor. Hiltermann is much more critical and partisan than Hunter on this issue. Hiltermann frequently disparages the conservatism of Fatah and the "bigotry" of Islamic groups while praising the progressivism of the PLO leftists and the communists. He is concerned that the uprising may actually reinforce some of the most repressive aspects of Palestinian culture. Hunter, on the other hand, notes a more benign desire to preserve a wide range of popular traditions, including customary law, arts, and religion. Hunter gives an informed and subtle account of the contribution of the Islamic movement to the Intifada that is refreshingly free of the usual polemics and stereotypes.

Both books are valuable supplements to earlier studies of West Bank and Gaza politics by writers such as Emile Sahliyeh and Ann Lesch, who focused more on elites and officeholders than on associations. Hiltermann is a sociologist who concentrates on the details of the labor and women's movements whereas Hunter is a historian who tries to situate social change in grand contexts, temporal and international. Neither study contains much in the way of social theory. Both are highly readable, mainly journalistic accounts that wisely allow many interviewed participants to speak for themselves. Hiltermann's voices are mostly left-wing organizers, whereas Hunter's are mostly fellow university professors and intellectuals. I strongly recommend listening to both choruses.

University of Chicago

ROBERT BIANCHI

**The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective.** By Ethan Barnaby Kapstein. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 252p. \$39.95.  
**The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspectives.** Edited by Andrew L. Ross. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991. 240p. \$47.95.

The combination of the Reagan military buildup and its consequences and the ending of the Cold War has inspired a recent burst of publications on the political

economy of national security. *Political economy* is a fashionable term these days and, as such, has become difficult to define. It encompasses quite a broad range of research in both approach and substance. At times, it includes far more than it excludes. Within the broad and somewhat nebulous category of political economy, what is the political economy of national security? To judge from these two volumes, the political economy of defense includes any analysis of the interactive relationship between politics and economics in the area of national security. For Ethan Kapstein, at the core is the fundamental and enduring question of nations' simultaneous pursuit of security and prosperity. According to Andrew Ross, who edited *The Political Economy of Defense*, it encompasses three areas of research: "(1) the political dimensions of economic actions in the defense realm; (2) the economic dimensions of political actions in the defense realm; and (3) the security dimensions of political economic actions" (p. 8). Despite the apparent parity among the three dimensions, the fundamental and dominant concerns are largely economic, including the economic consequences of defense spending, the economics of international arms trade, defense industries, fiscal constraints, and defense planning.

These two books share more than an emphasis on political economy. Both volumes are comparative and international in approach. The Kapstein text explicitly argues that the political economy of national security can only be understood as an interaction of national and international forces and that this is increasingly the case in an interdependent world economy. It also uses comparative cases throughout, from both developed and developing countries. The chapters in the Ross volume, while sometimes focused on one country, tend toward comparative and international analysis, as well.

While the books begin from common concerns and subject matter, they diverge in their merit as scholarship and in their utility for the classroom; that is, the Kapstein volume is a relatively succinct textbook, while the Ross volume is an edited reader, and each enjoys the benefits and drawbacks of their respective formats. The Kapstein book is comprehensive in scope but of rather shallow depth. The Ross volume has sufficient depth in many chapters but is like many other edited volumes a somewhat eclectic selection of topics and contrasting approaches.

As a textbook, the Kapstein volume is a solid piece of work. It is nearly up to date (the best that can be expected of anything published today in international relations), comprehensive in its coverage, and strengthened by the comparative and international perspective. In good textbook fashion, it touches on most of the major issues on the economic side of national security, including chapters on defense spending, defense industries and procurement, the arms trade, economic relations among military allies, and the effect of a global economy on national security. Most of the discussion is well done and informative. Kapstein's emphasis on the effects of interdependence, including the internationalization of defense production, is especially interesting. But two drawbacks are evident.

First, the breadth of coverage is not matched by sufficient depth. Several of the chapters left me (imagining myself as a student) wanting more—much more in some cases. Only a few of the chapters (e.g., that on the arms trade) seemed to provide enough substance and detail. Good students, I think, will be left unsatisfied.

One chapter on mobilization, war, and conversion, for example, was weighted more toward mobilization than conversion, although the latter, I think, is the more controversial and more interesting problem these days.

Second, the author's initial analytic framework and subsequent claims about frameworks are handled somewhat loosely. The introduction offers the obligatory tour of the major paradigms in International Political Economy (liberalism, realism or neomercantilism, and marxism); but there is a lack of clarity about whether students are to use them as explanations of, or prescriptions for, state behavior. Marxism is described as an explanation (it is not, of course, prescriptive). But Kapstein ends the introduction by saying the best policy prescription is a combination of liberalism and realism. From there on, the IPE trinity is not used systematically. And much of what Kapstein talks about does not necessarily fit those models anyway—such as weapons procurement and defense spending, where national politics and bureaucratic forces are important. This makes the IPE models look rather obligatory and pro forma. Kapstein's claim that he wants to provide a framework for analysis in each chapter only underscores this problem. Frameworks rarely emerge clearly (the chapter on alliances is an exception). Most of the time, one has been given a good introduction to the topic and provided with some concepts and examples.

The Ross volume seeks to transcend the traditionally segregated political and economic approaches to the study of national defense. In his introduction, Ross makes a tentative case for the *political economy of defense* as a nascent and potentially coherent subfield; but this attempt seems strained. Just as political economy is a collection of theoretical approaches and substantive concerns, so is the political economy of defense. Consequently, the merit of the volume is in the individual chapters, not in its effort to define an emerging endeavor. As the title and author note, it is an assemblage of issues and perspectives. Moreover, the kind of work in the Ross book has been going on for quite some time. Somewhat uneven in their quality, most of the chapters are interesting and informative; yet all in all, they offer no surprises or innovative approaches and insights. Most of the findings are familiar or self-consciously inconclusive.

Although the editor argues that the political economy of defense transcends a narrow focus on the economic consequences of military spending, 5 of the 10 chapters address that problem directly; and it is an indirect concern in 1 or 2 others. For example, Steve Chan provides a brief literature review on the relationship between military spending and economic performance; and Daniel Nelson examines the impact of Warsaw Pact defense spending on member nations. Much of this work is substantial and well-done research, such as Judith Reppy's comparative piece on the relationship between military research and development funding and international trade performance and David R. Davis and Steve Chan's longitudinal analysis of security and welfare in Taiwan. The most political analysis is the chapter on electoral cycles and defense spending in Israel, by Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward. Politics is also important in Glenn Fong's very good chapter on Pentagon-industry collaboration in high technology.

While one doubts that the political economy of defense is more than a broad set of issues and perspectives, that is not an argument against its importance as

an area of research. I do have a concern about the apparent increase in economy-centered research in the area of defense and national security now that the Cold War is ending. My concern is that the strong tilt toward economic analysis and economic issues could crowd out real politics and political analysis of military policy, in much the same way that the dominance of strategic logics (e.g., deterrence theory) in international relations theory tended to preclude the insights of political analysis in our understanding of national security policy during the Cold War.

University of California, Santa Cruz

DANIEL WIRLS

**From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China.** By Hong Yung Lee. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 437p. \$48.50.

Hong Yung Lee's new book is an extremely broad study of "the structure, personnel, and historical formation of the cadre system in China" (p. 1). It covers the entire history of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) from its founding in 1921 to the present although the bulk of the material deals with the post-Mao reform era. An immense amount of data, including 56 tables, are presented on all levels of the Party and state from the highest officials in the land to ordinary cadres and Party members. The substantive issues covered include recruitment patterns, bureaucratic methods of personnel management, the politics of cadre staffing, and speculative argument concerning the characteristics of the political system emerging during the reform period. While readers will undoubtedly find something of interest in this wide-ranging study, it has significant limitations in terms of both empirical accuracy and conceptual clarity.

Although the book's central theme that there has been an elite transformation from "revolutionary cadres" to "Party technocrats" is clearly stated in the title and is, within limits, noncontroversial, it is more difficult to determine its basic argument in terms of how elite composition relates to political outcomes. Perhaps the most representative statement of the author's position is that "the less institutionalized a political system [like China's], the more likely political elites will bring the ideology, experiences, and outlooks of the social classes from which they came into the political process" (p. 387). There are several problems with this which can be seen in Lee's treatment of the revolutionary cadres dominant in the Maoist era. First, Lee ascribes an alleged "continuing rural orientation of the revolutionary elite" after 1949—itself a questionable notion—to the initial recruitment of the ruling elite "largely from poor peasants with a low level of education" (pp. 47, 387). This is simply not so if we regard the "ruling elite" as most concretely represented by the Central Committee elected in 1956. As Donald Klein's work 30 years ago demonstrated, these leaders were far from the bottom of the traditional social scale in their origins and they were quite well educated with substantial numbers having tertiary, and even foreign, training. But perhaps *ruling elite* is meant to refer to the Party as a whole, where the characterization would be more (but hardly fully) adequate. Such an approach is suggested by various assertions that political outlooks, such as the "rural orientation," came not so much from the CCP's top leadership but from the mass membership. For example, Lee ar-

gues that "the root of the Maoist ultraleftist tendency should be traced back to the cadre corps. . . . In this sense Mao's peasant mentality represented rather than shaped those of the majority of cadres" (pp. 73-74). But given all we know about the leader-dominated Chinese system, the suggestion that fundamental regime policies largely reflected the social characteristics of ordinary CCP members, which were in fact quite different from those of the top leadership, is very hard to credit.

There is, however, more to credit the notion, also advanced by Lee, that much political conflict can be explained by the concept of "situational groups," that is, groups forged by the impact of particular state policies on their members. Here he usefully adopts the well-established distinction among the victims, survivors, and beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution in explaining developments in both the last days of the Maoist period and the early post-Mao era. But apart from some errors of fact (e.g., the treatment of Chen Yun, perhaps the major architect of the reform of the cadre system, as essentially having little to do with it), shortcomings to the approach are reflected in the contradictions within Lee's account. Lee astutely ascribes the impetus for reform to the rehabilitated victims of the Cultural Revolution, who, having suffered Maoist excesses and had the opportunity to reflect upon the shortcomings of the system during their period in the wilderness, became "born-again reformers" once returned to power (p. 168). Yet key members of this group, including Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo are elsewhere pictured as conservative opponents of reform (see, e.g., pp. 285-86). While there undoubtedly is something in this, too, the book lacks a systematic analysis of the paradox. It offers neither a careful empirical examination of the politics of the "old revolutionaries" nor a theoretical explanation of their presumed shift of position.

Finally, the discussion of the background of the new generation of Party technocrats provides some rich detail on their well-known characteristics but leaves unsettled major questions concerning the politics of this generation. Indeed, quite sensibly Lee cautiously canvasses alternative theories concerning the tendencies of technocratic leaders and, on more than one occasion, notes that no definitive conclusion is possible. Nevertheless, he does have a preferred view that the technocratic concern with results, rather than ideology, will result in a greater tendency to bargain and compromise, the likelihood of a collective style of leadership, and fewer power struggles and purges than marked the rule of the old revolutionaries (see p. 407). Still, as Lee acknowledges, the relative lack of close personal ties among the technocrats could result in division or stalemate; and a detailed examination of elite politics during the reform era (only spasmodically undertaken in the book) might show the restraining hand of the surviving old revolutionaries on their younger colleagues, who would possibly have been much more prone to open conflict if left to their own devices. Most of all, a careful reconstruction of reform politics would arguably show that the likelihood of polarized, as opposed to consensual, politics has more to do with the problems and stresses facing the leadership than with the characteristics of particular elite groups.

University of Sydney

FREDERICK C. TEIWES